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1  Onlife After the Computational Turn?
1.1  Computational Turn
In my inaugural lecture I have reiterated the notion of a computational turn, refer-
ring to the novel layers of software that have nested themselves between us and 
reality (Hildebrandt 2013). These layers of decisional algorithmic adaptations 
increasingly co-constitute our lifeworld, determine what we get to see (search 
engines; behavioural advertising), how we are treated (insurance, employment, edu-
cation, medical treatment), what we know (the life sciences, the digital humanities, 
expert systems in a variety of professions) and how we manage our risks (safety, 
security, aviation, critical infrastructure, smart grids). So far, this computational 
turn has been applauded, taken for granted or rejected, but little attention has been 
paid to the far-reaching implications for our perception and cognition, for the re-
woven fabric on which our living-together hinges (though there is a first attempt in 
Ess and Hagengruber 2011, and more elaboration in Berry 2012). The network ef-
fects of ubiquitous digitization have been described extensively (Castells 2011; Van 
Dijk 2006), though many authors present this as a matter of ‘the social’, neglecting 
the extent to which the disruptions of networked, mobile, global digital technolo-
gies are indeed ‘affordances’ of the socio-technical assemblages of ‘the digital’. 
Reducing these effects to ‘the social’ does not help, because this leaves the constitu-
tive and regulative workings of these technologies under the radar. Moreover, we 
need to distinguish between digitization per se and computational techniques such 
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as machine learning that enable adaptive and proactive computing and thereby pres-
ent us with an entirely novel—smart—environment.
1.2  Smart Environments
I believe that whereas such smart environments have long remained a technological 
fantasy, they are now with us, around us, even inside us (Hildebrandt and Anrig 2012). 
They anticipate our future behaviours and adapt their own behaviours to accommo-
date our inferred preferences—at least insofar as this fits the objectives of whoever is 
paying for them (commercial enterprise, government). They provide us with a ubiqui-
tous artificial intelligence that uproots the common sense of our Enlightenment heri-
tage that matter is passive and mind active. Matter is developing into mind, becoming 
context-sensitive, capable of learning on the basis of feedback mechanisms, reconfig-
uring its own programs to improve its performance, developing ‘a mind of its own’, 
based on second-order beliefs and preferences. This means nothing less than the emer-
gence of environments that have agent-like characteristics: they are viable, engines 
of abduction, and adaptable (Bourgine and Varela 1992); they are context-sensitive, 
responsive, and capable of sustaining their identity by reconfiguring the rules that 
regulate their behaviours (Floridi and Sanders 2004). We note, of course, that so far 
‘they’ are not consciously aware of any of this, let alone self-conscious. Also, let’s ac-
knowledge that we are not talking about what Clark (2003) termed ‘skinbags’: neatly 
demarcated entities that contain their mind within their outer membranes, surface or 
skin. The intelligence that emerges from the computational layers is engineered to 
serve specific purposes, while thriving on the added value created by unexpected 
function creep; it derives from polymorphous, mobile computing systems, not from 
stand-alone devices such as those fantasised in the context of humanoid robotics.
1.3  What’s New Here?
In what sense is this a novel situation? Where lies the continuity with preceding 
information and communication technologies? In his magnificent Les technologies 
de l’intelligence Pierre Lévy (1990) discussed the transitions from orality to script, 
printing press and mass media towards digitisation and the internet. Summing up, 
Lévy suggests that we are in transition from a linear sense of time to segments and 
points; from accumulation to instant access; from delay and duration to real-time 
and immediacy; from universalization to contextualisation; from theory to model-
ling; from interpretation to simulation; from semantics to syntaxis; from truth to 
effectiveness; from semantics to pragmatics; from stability to change. Interestingly, 
his focus is on ubiquitous computing and he highlights the impact of the hyperlink, 
but hardly engages with the computational intelligence described above. Core to 
the more recent, ambient intelligence, is the fact that human beings are anticipated 
by complex, invisible computing systems (Stiegler 2013). Their capacity to gener-
ate data derivatives (Amoore 2011) and to pre-empt our intentions on the basis 
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of personalised inferences creates what Catherine Dwyer (2009) has called ‘the 
inference problem’. The thingness of our artificial environment seems to turn into 
a kind of subjectivity, acquiring a form of agency. In other work I have suggested 
that social science has long since recognized the productive nature of the inference 
problem that nourishes relationships between humans (Hildebrandt 2011a). Nota-
bly, sociologists Parsons as well as Luhmann spoke of the so-called double contin-
gency that determines the fundamental uncertainty of human interaction (Vanders-
traeten 2007). Since I can never be sure how you will read my words or my actions, 
I try to infer what you will infer from my behaviours; the same goes for you. We 
are forever guessing each other’s interpretations. Zizek (1991) has qualified the 
potentially productive nature of this double and mutual anticipation by suggesting 
that ‘communication is a successful misunderstanding’. What is new here is that 
the computational layer that mediates our access to knowledge and information is 
anticipating us, creating a single contingency: whereas it has access to Big Data to 
make its inferences (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 2013), we have no such access 
and no way of guessing how we are being ‘read’ by our novel smart environments.
1.4  Which Are the Challenges?
If going Onlife refers to immersing ourselves in the novel environments that depend on 
and nourish the computational layers discussed above, then going Onlife will require 
new skills, different capacities and other capabilities. To prevent us from becoming 
merely the cognitive resource for these environments we must figure out how they are 
anticipating us. We must develop ways to extend the singly contingency to a renewed 
double contingency. How to read in what ways we are being read? How to guess the 
manner in which we are being categorized, foreseen and pre-empted? How to keep sur-
prising our environments, how to move from their proaction to our interaction? In other 
work I have suggested that we need to probe at least two tracks: first, to develop human 
machine interfaces that give us unobtrusive intuitive access to how we are being pro-
filed, and, second, a new hermeneutics that allows us to trace at the technical level how 
the underlying algorithms can be ‘read’ and contested (Hildebrandt 2011b, 2012). For 
now, the point I would like to make is that the implications of going Onlife cannot be 
reduced to privacy and data protection. I hope that the previous analysis demonstrates a 
far more extensive impact that cannot be understood solely in terms of the wish to hide 
one’s personal data. It requires more than that; indeed it challenges us to engage with 
our environments as if we are taking ‘the intentional stance’ with them (Dennett 2009).
2  Publics and their Problems in Smart Environments
2.1  Smart Environments and the Public Sphere
Above I have tried to flesh out in what sense smart environments present us with a 
novel situation. My conclusion was that the computational layers that mediate our 
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perception and cognition of the world are generating an environment that simulates 
agency. Whereas the International Telecommunications Union spoke of the Internet 
of Things as ‘the offline world going online’ (ITU 2005), in some sense the plethora 
of autonomic decision systems are turning our inanimate environment ‘Onlife’. In 
this section I will investigate what this means for the public sphere, or even for the 
traditional private/public divide in itself. I will engage with the notion of the public 
sphere to inquire whether and how smart environments generate a kind of ‘natality’ 
here (Arendt 1958): a novelty, a beginning, an empty space to experiment—with as 
yet unknown affordances.
2.2  Public Private Social: Performance, Exposure, Opacity
Much has been written about the shrinking of the private, the blurring of the public/
private divide and, for instance, the loss of privacy in public (notably Nissenbaum 
1997). Such shrinking, loss and blurring have been attributed to either the lure of 
self-publication in web 2.0 (Cohen 2012), or to the secretive trading with and spy-
ing on our behavioural data in the course of pervasive computing (Cohen 2012; 
Hildebrandt 2012).
Maybe we should return to Arendt (1958), when she spoke of the private as a 
sphere of necessity (the household), the public as the space for freedom (political 
action) and ‘the social’ as the emergence of mass society (bureaucracy, individual 
self-interest and conformity). Her understanding of ‘the social’ or what she called 
‘society’ is not altogether positive, to put it mildly. Is the rise of web 2.0 antitheti-
cal to ‘the social’, because it concerns communication of one-2one, one-2-many 
as well as many-2-many, rather than many-2-one? Or does the processing of Big 
Data present us with ‘the social’ come true, where ‘the social’ is constituted by 
machine-readable bits and pieces that allow for the ultimate version of what Hei-
degger (1996) called ‘das rechnende Denken’ (calculative thinking)? I am not sure, 
and I believe the jury is still out. The answer will depend on empirical evidence of 
how ‘the social’ continues to evolve in smart environments.
I do think that Arendt’s understanding of the private and the public might save 
us from dichotomous thinking, as well as from the glorification of ‘private life’ as 
a sphere of uncontroversial freedom. Simultaneously, we must come to terms with 
the fact that her glorification of the public sphere has little connection with present 
day politics, which rather fall within the scope of her depiction of ‘the social’. We 
should also note that her glorification of politics as a ‘theatre of debate’ (other than 
the realm of household economics) is rooted in an appreciation of privacy as ‘some 
darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, 
non-subjective sense’ (Arendt 1958, S. 71). To speak and act ‘in public’ one must 
leave the security of one’s home. But to distinguish oneself and to take the risk of 
being refuted, requires courage, daring and a place to hide. To recuperate from the 
tyranny of public opinion (Mill 1859) we need a measure of opacity to re-constitute 
the self, far from the social pressures that could turn us into obedient self-disci-
plined subjects (Hutton et al. 1988). In fact I would agree with Butler (2005), where 
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she underscores the constitutive opacity of the self, that invites reiterant attempts to 
invent a coherent narrative of who we are, but at the same time escapes all narrative 
since the emergence of our self is hidden in our own prehistory (the infancy before 
we acquired language).
My question concerning the public in smart environments would thus be: how 
to design our ONLIFE in a way that affords a sustainable public performance,1 an 
empowering opacity of the self and a range of exposures that incorporates the need 
for self-expression, identity performance as well as the generosity of forgetfulness, 
erasure and the chance to reinvent oneself?
2.3  Public Performance in the ONLIFE Everywhere
Maybe ONLIFE has two dimensions, as suggested above. The first concerns self-
publication or reputation management. It is a type of social networking (Facebook, 
Twitter, Foursquare, Instagram, YouTube, Training Intelligence Programs, En-
hanced Reality), a pervasive ambience of sharing self-images, brief text, photo’s, 
video’s, location, ‘likes’, ‘dislikes’, sport’s performance, health status or profes-
sional reputation. The second dimension of ONLIFE concerns the ubiquitous 
measurement, calculation and manipulation of the data that leak from everyday 
behaviours, and the way these behavioural data are used to predict, pre-empt and 
thus manage future states of mind, choices and decisions, for instance in the case of 
behavioural advertising, location based services, fraud detection, actuarial calcula-
tions, remote healthcare, neuromarketing or criminal profiling.2 Both seem to draw 
individual ‘users’ into Arendt’s ‘the social’. ‘Users’ have become what she calls ‘a 
society’, an assembly of individuals that manage their reputation, while also being 
managed as a resource for government and the industry. In fact, the computational 
infrastructure employs behavioural traces as its cognitive resource.
The questions generated by all this focus, on what affordances the ONLIFE 
should develop to enable a shared, agonistically organised public space that allows 
a plurality of ‘users’ to develop a voice, to partake in democratic decision-making 
and to hold each other to account, while at the same time providing the ‘users’ 
with effective means to withdraw, to unplug, to delete and start over. This 
raises three additional inquiries. First, the question of how to protect ‘users’ against 
invisible manipulation (because of the hidden complexity), unfair exclusion 
(because of the lack of transparency that disables contestation), and undesirable 
exposure (because of the ubiquitous pressure to ‘post’ an update of one’s where/
what/who-abouts)? Second, the question of how to empower Onlife inhabitants in a 
1 I use capital ‘ONLIFE’ when speaking of the ‘world’ we inhabit (Onlife as a noun) and lower 
case ‘Onlife’ when using the term to describe attributes of our being (Onlife as an adverb or adjec-
tive).
2 With the World Economic Forum (“Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class” 2011) 
we can distinguish between volunteered, observed and inferred data. Data-driven environments 
indeed thrive on the combination of provided, leaked and derived data. Consumers and citizens, 
however, are seldom aware of the leaked and derived data.
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way that enables them to challenge the design of their world? Is this about renego-
tiating the social contract? Or is it about construction work; how to build an Onlife 
world that is not a global village, nor a walled garden, but an extended urbanity? 
Third, the question of how this connects to the dimension of agency that is emerging 
within the Onlife experience; how can inhabitants or visitors of the ONLIFE learn 
to guess how they are being anticipated?
2.4  A Plurality of Publics, a Choice of Exposure, a Place to Hide
In 1927 Dewey wrote The public and its problems. The book is an extended re-
ply to Lippman’s (1997) analysis of democratic government in the age of mass 
media, high tech instrumentation and societal complexity. I find his analysis and 
the normative position he takes on democratic practice highly relevant for our cur-
rent enterprise. As Marres (2005) has demonstrated Dewey agrees with Lippman’s 
diagnosis, but not with his cure. Whereas Lippman believes the only solution is 
technocratic government, Dewey argues for a new understanding of democracy. For 
a start, he reminds us that representative democracy (voting) is a matter of delega-
tion, relieving people from the burden of governing themselves. Second, he believes 
that once people discover that their delegates are not doing a good job with regard 
to a specific issue, they will seek out their fellows and form a public around this is-
sue. Interestingly, the formation of publics and issues is a matter of co-constitution: 
no issue, no public [and vice versa]. This leads Dewey to understand democracy 
as the process of simultaneously constructing publics and issues, whereby people 
regain a measure of control over issues their delegates forsake. Publics and issues 
are thus performed, constructed, fabricated–not given. Their articulation and their 
assemblage require hard work. There is not one—given—Public, but a multiplicity 
of publics that changes shape in relation to the issues they frame. And also, in rela-
tion to each other.
Dewey’s publics differ from Arendt’s public sphere. His publics are more em-
pirical and contingent and they have less continuity. In fact a successful public will 
resolve its issue and cease to exist as such. However, both Dewey and Arendt’s pub-
lics require individuals who take the risk of raising their voice, contesting common 
sense and—more importantly—initiating the construction of a new common sense 
around what they present as an issue. Dewey seems less interested in opposing ‘the 
social’ with ‘the public’. His definition of democracy demonstrates a fundamental 
trust in the wisdom of crowds (to be distinguished from a naïve wisdom of ‘the 
Crowd’). Like Mouffe (2000) in political theory and Rip (2003) in constructive 
Technology Assessment, Dewey trusts the outcome of agonistic decision-making 
processes. His publics are always under construction—they thrive on, contest and 
challenge whatever pretends to represent ‘the social’. They ground a natality in 
the midst of ‘the social’, a possibility for radical reinvention of what is taken for 
granted.
What interests me here is how we—a public constituted around the issue of 
ONLIFE—can contribute to the design, the engineering, the construction of an 
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ONLIFE that affords the formation and un-formation of publics, while protecting 
and cherishing the opacities of the individuals that make these publics. In fact I 
believe that the 2012 draft Regulation of Data Protection holds several gems that 
may actually provide stepping-stones to such an ONLIFE. In the third part of this 
contribution I venture into the radical choices it presents and the bridges it builds 
between legislation, architecture, social norms and market forces (Lessig 2006).
3  Legal Protection by Design: A Novel Social Contract?
3.1  The Nature of the Social Contract
Having explained, in the first section, the challenges of an environment that comes 
Onlife due to a ubiquitous and pervasive layer of machine learning, I have put for-
ward, in the second section, the question of what this means for the public, the so-
cial and the private. My conclusion was that we need to construct an infrastructure 
that allows for a plurality of publics, a choice of exposure and places to hide. Such 
an infrastructure cannot be taken for granted, it will not appear of itself, nor will it 
grow organically or ‘naturally’ from the computational layers we are currently put-
ting in place.
The social contract that combined the idea of limited government with—ulti-
mately—representative, deliberative and participative self-government was the 
result of a historic bargain (Nonet and Selznick 1978). This bargain sealed the au-
tonomy of the law in relation to politics on the condition of non-interference; the 
independence of the courts thus combined with the monopoly of the legislator to 
enact the law. We can summarize this as the legislator writing and enacting the law, 
while the court speaks and interprets the law. Let’s invoke Montesquieu’s often mis-
understood maxim: iudex—non rex—lex loqui. Not the king but the judge speaks 
the law (Schönfeld 2008). This was an attack on the medieval maxim that attributed 
all powers to the king: rex lex loqui. The division of tasks that follows from the 
historic bargain between enacting and speaking the law was based on the socio-
technical infrastructure of the printing press; the checks and balances of the Rule 
of Law depend on the sequential processing of written codes that can be debated, 
interpreted and contested by those under their rule. The fact that the courts have the 
final word in case of a conflict guarantees a measure of due process, which guaran-
tees that fundamental rights are an effective part of the social contract. This is not to 
say that the printing press ‘caused’ the Rule of Law, but to suggest that it created a 
socio-technical infrastructure conducive to a specific division of tasks between the 
differentiated powers of the state. This division has specific temporal dimensions: 
the court speaks after the legislator enacts; courts are bound by the law enacted 
by the legislator, while in turn the legislator is bound by the interpretation of the 
courts—the circle is virtuous; it constitutes countervailing powers and creates room 
for both enforcement and contestation. All this is part of modernity. It depends on 
the internal division of sovereignty. Ultimately it depends on the institutionalisation 
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of the monopoly of violence which is at the core of the operations of sovereignty; 
effective protection of fundamental rights is only possible if the state can enforce 
them even where enforcement is required against the state itself.
3.2  Protecting Modernity’s Assets: Reconstructing the Social 
Contract
In his Die Aufklärung in the Age of Philosophical Engineering Stiegler (2013) ac-
cepts the challenge introduced by Tim Berners-Lee, who argued that ‘we are not 
analysing a world, we are building it. We are not experimental philosophers; we are 
philosophical engineers’ (Halpin 2008). Berners-Lee was not merely describing the 
activities of the architects of the World Wide Web he invented. He was calling them 
to account for the impact of their engineering on the constitution of mind and soci-
ety. He was inviting them to build a new res publica. Stiegler is more careful. He 
suggests that digital technology is a pharmakon: ‘it can lead either to the destruc-
tion of the mind, or to its rebirth (ib.).’ Referring to Wolf (2008) he notes that the 
transition from the reading mind to the digitally extended mind entails substantive 
changes to the composition and behaviour of our brains. Though these changes may 
be cause for celebration, they also threaten the constitution of the self. In the course 
of his text Stiegler reiterates the crucial question of what we need to preserve as a 
valuable heritage of the era of the ‘reading brain’ (Wolf 2008). I want to connect this 
with the need to reconstruct the social contract, recognizing its modern roots and its 
contingency on the ICT infrastructure of the printing press. A new social contract 
would have to align with the novel technological landscape, co-opting current ICTs 
to incorporate checks & balances. In that sense we will need a hybrid social contract 
that testifies to the agency-characteristics of smart environments.3
Though we might wish to declare ‘Game over for modernity’, this may require 
us to give up on the social contract that protects against immoderate government. 
Let us remind ourselves that the end of modernity would not necessarily be the end 
of totalitarian governance. The hidden complexity of computational layers in fact 
affords refined and invisible manipulations that may be closer to the totalitarian 
nightmares of Kafka’s Trial (Solove 2004) and Forster Machine (Forster 2009) then 
to the dictatorial schemes of Big Brother watching you. Stiegler (2013) notes that
the spread of traceability seems to be used primarily to increase the heteronomy of indi-
viduals through behaviour-profiling rather than their autonomy.
The ‘old-school’ social contract will not necessarily survive when cut lose from 
the ICT infrastructure of the printing press. The idea of the social as a distinctive 
sphere is in fact typical for modernity’s reliance on information and communica-
tion technologies that sustain a further distantiation and differentiation of societal 
3 The ‘old’—modern—social contract was itself a hybrid affair, due to its contingency upon the 
technologies of the printing press. In using the term ‘hybrid’ I highlight the awareness that a new 
hybridity is necessary, tuned to the new ICT infrastructure.
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spheres. Oral societies do not have written constitutions capable of keeping their 
economic and military leaders in check; they require a continuous calibration that 
entails a persistent threat of violence to keep the vicious circle of private revenge 
at bay (Hoebel 1971). Societies of the manuscript (the handwritten script) have no 
means to contest written laws for the majority that does not read or write, they thrive 
on the monopoly of the class of scribes that buffers between ruler and subjects, thus 
also protecting its own monopoly (Glenn 2007). Only the printing press provides 
the specific affordances conducive to the agonistic framework of representative, 
deliberative and participative democracies under the Rule of Law (Hildebrandt 
and Gutwirth 2007). To preserve the preconditions of constitutional democracy we 
need to acknowledge modernity’s dependence on sequential thinking (Wolf’s era 
of the reading brain) and its temporal structure that favours reflection over reflexes 
(Wolf’s era of the reading brain). This entails an attempt to engage with the benefits 
of modernity. Though hierarchical and linear models of social life may have lost 
territory, we may have to reconstruct and reengineer them insofar as they protect us 
from chaos and contingent power games. Of course this entails keeping hierarchies 
in bounds in function of the purpose they should serve.
A hierarchy that organizes countervailing powers may save us from the totalitar-
ian rule of transnational computational decision-systems. Nevertheless, we should 
acknowledge that the dreams of early cyberspace utopists have not come through; 
the nation state has not lost its bearing and territorial jurisdiction has not become 
meaningless (Goldsmith and Wu 2008). This requires vigilance in the face of po-
tential attempts to turn cyberspace into a set of Walled Gardens that might reinforce 
not merely totalitarianism but also tyranny (Mueller 2010). We must investigate 
how the novel affordances of cyberspace can be engineered in a way that sets us 
free as well as constraining those in charge, while fostering a fair distribution of ca-
pabilities (Cohen 2012). This urges us to take into account that whereas cyberspace 
may change the game for modernity’s incentive structure, it still nourishes on the 
system of legal-political checks and balances that was generated by modernity’s 
socio-technical infrastructure.
3.3  Technology Neutrality and Legal Protection by Design
One way of dealing with the implications of cyberspace as a game changer is to 
integrate legal protection into its socio-technical backbone: its hardware, software 
and the numerous protocols and standards that enable and constrain its affordances. 
I have coined this ‘legal protection by design’, connecting the concept to research 
communities working on value-sensitive design (Flanagan et al. 2007), construc-
tive technology assessment (Rip et al. 1995), upstream engagement with scientific 
research (Wynne 1995), privacy impact assessment (Wright and de Hert 2012) and 
privacy by design and default (Cavoukian 2009; Langheinrich 2001).
Legal protection by design is not about technical enforcement of legal compli-
ance; legal problems cannot be solved by technical solutions. The concept of legal 
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protection by design refers to novel articulations of fundamental legal rights into 
ICT infrastructures other than the printing press. Both lawyers and policy mak-
ers tend to display the Pavlov reflex of writing and enacting new laws when legal 
problems occur, whereas cyberspace easily turns written law into a paper dragon. 
Modern law is articulated by means of the technology of the printing press and 
in cyberspace its monopoly seems hard to enforce. Moreover, public administra-
tion has developed techniques to automatically enforce written administrative 
rules by translating them into automated decision systems. Social security, taxation 
and numerous permits are now granted or imposed on the basis of such decisions 
(Citron 2007). Legal protection by design should, however, not be confused with 
such techno-regulation or technological enforcement of legal compliance. Law is 
not administration, politics or policy. Legal protection by design instead implies that 
written legal rules and their underlying unwritten legal principles develop a new 
type of technology-neutrality. Other than some authors suggest, technology neu-
trality requires a keen eye on the normative implications of technological develop-
ments (Reed 2007; Hildebrandt 2008; Hildebrandt and Tielemans 2013). Wherever 
a technology changes the substance or the effectiveness of a right, its articulation 
must be reconsidered to take into account how we wish to reconceptualise and/or 
reframe the right within the network of related rights and principles. The socio-tech-
nical infrastructure of cyberspace often affects the network and the context of sets 
of rights; for instance, rights to compensation based on tort or breach of contract, as 
well as rights to privacy, due process and non-discrimination. Technology neutrality 
therefor requires a lively debate amongst lawyers, but should also generate a similar 
debate amongst the architects of cyberspace on how to reinvent, to reengineer and 
to redesign democracy and the Rule of Law in the Onlife environment.
3.4  The Proposed Data Protection Regulation
Let’s now be practical. Though some inhabitants of the ONLIFE may claim that 
data protection is boring and concerns an outdated attempt to revive ‘old-school’ 
privacy, I would argue that the legal framework of Data Protection is particularly 
well tuned to the data-driven environment of cyberspace. Whereas the value of pri-
vacy may indeed have been an affordance of the era of the printing press (Stalder 
2002), we should not sit back to sing its requiem, instead, we need to assess how to 
re-invent privacy as a dimension of the Onlife habitat. The Fair Information Princi-
ples that inform the legal framework of data protection seem particularly apt to cope 
with the flux of de- and re-contextualization that drives cyberspatial innovation 
(Kallinikos 2006). So far, however, these principles were articulated as paper drag-
ons, trailing an irritating bureaucracy while at the same time enforcement seemed 
an illusion due to the lack of penal competence, budget and personnel on the side of 
data protection supervisors. Compliance has long been a matter of (minor) costs, to 
be taken into account after new business models were set in place.
The proposed Regulation could be a game changer. It establishes a new incen-
tive structure and is based on a salient understanding of law’s need for effective 
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[not theoretical] technology neutrality. The Regulation presents the combined force 
of a mandatory data protection impact assessment, data protection by default (data 
minimisation at the level of applications), data portability (enabling an effective 
right to withdraw consent without losing the value of self-generated profiles), the 
right to forget (requiring effective mechanisms to achieve a reasonable measure 
of erasure of one’s personal data if no legal ground applies for their processing), 
rights against measures based on profiling (a right to object to being subjected to 
automated decisions and transparency rights as to the existence of such measures 
and their envisaged effects) and finally data protection by design (which imposes 
the duty of adequate mechanisms for compliance on commercial and governmental 
data controllers). All this would have no effect if the proposal had not ensured ef-
ficient mechanisms to incentivize the industry to actually develop data protection 
by design: the liability regime is inspired by competition law (fines of maximum 
2 % of global turnover) while the burden of proof per default rests with the data con-
trollers. If the proposed Regulation survives the legislative process, it may finally 
create the level playing field that challenges companies and governments to develop 
intuitive and auditable transparency tools. ONLIFE inhabitants will then have the 
chance to play around with the system, exploring and inventing their identities in 
the interstices of the hybrid social contexts that shape their capabilities. This should 
empower them—us—to establish a new hybrid social contract that enables a plural-
ity of publics, a choice of exposure and places to hide. Writing did not erase speech, 
but it changed the nature of speech (Ong 1982); computational layers will not erase 
writing, but it will change the nature of the reading mind. This may be a good thing, 
but that will depend on how we invent the infrastructure that will invent us.
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